Unless David Cameron comes up with better reasons for bombing Islamic State in Syria, MPs should refuse to give him the green light to do so.
The main weakness in the British PM’s case is that it does not show how bombing Islamic State would advance the peace process in Syria – which Cameron acknowledges is the priority. Unless the non-Islamic State forces stop fighting one another, there’s precious little chance of getting a ground force together that can exterminate the jihadists. Any UK military intervention, therefore, needs to be judged against the yardstick of whether it will advance the peace process.
Cameron’s failure to address this issue properly in his 24-page memorandum published last week, is therefore, a major lacuna. There are a few bald statements that bombing will help the peace process but no argument. The document also fails to tackle a number of points to the effect that more intensified bombing might actually hinder the peace process.
Cameron does explain how the peace process finally has some legs. After the Paris attacks and the blowing up of a Russian civilian plane over Sinai, the outside powers are now more keen to push Bashar al-Assad and the “moderate” rebels to do a deal – although Turkey’s downing of a Russian military jet last week has complicated things. (See my column about the Vienna peace process here). But the prime minister then proceeds to the non sequitur that it is now therefore time to scale up Britain’s military intervention (page 6). Insofar as he has an argument, it is that “degrading and defeating ISIL will help promote a political transition by strengthening the moderate opposition forces.” (page 13)
If bombing the jihadists would strengthen the “moderate” opposition, this would indeed be a good reason for doing so. But Cameron gives so little detail of what type of military action he plans that it is impossible to have any confidence that it will have the desired effect. In the entire document, there’s virtually no information that goes beyond the woolly sentence: “The Coalition’s military strategy aims to stop ISIL’s advance through the air campaign, to strike them in their heartland and to put them under pressure by continuing to degrade and dismantle their economic and military capability.” (Page 8) This isn’t an adequate basis for going to war.
What’s more there are four reasons to worry about air strikes.
First, intensified bombing will kill more innocent civilians. Not only will this be morally dubious, it will fuel Islamic State propaganda that it alone is the defender of Sunni Muslims against Crusaders and infidels. If so, it could be counterproductive, increasing support for the jihadists both inside Syria and elsewhere (including among radicalised Muslims in Britain).
Cameron doesn’t directly address this issue in his memo, although he does say that the RAF’s Brimstone missile “enables us to strike accurately with low collateral damage” (page 24). If British bombing was merely going to displace air strikes undertaken by less accurate partners, it might lead to fewer civilian deaths. However, since the intention is to step up the military action, collateral damage will rise.
In this context, it is important to ask whether the Syrian people want us to bomb them. This excellent report by The Observer giving the views of people who have fled Islamic State oppression in its capital Raqqa suggests that many don’t.
Second, intensified bombing may help Assad more than it helps the so-called moderate rebels. If this is so, the Syrian government will be under less pressure to cut a deal with the moderates and the peace process will be undermined. In that scenario, Assad would continue to oppress the Sunnis and more of these would be drawn to jihadism – whether the Islamic State or some other, possibly new variety.
It is possible to imagine some sorts of bombing that could help the “moderate” rebels — for example, if an Islamic State unit was about to advance on a rebel position and the RAF was able to wipe it out. But the impact of other types of bombing could be counterproductive — say if the Coalition could severely weaken Islamic State in Raqqa, and Assad ground troops, with the support of Russian air power, were able to finish the job.
What makes bombing so dubious as a tactic is that the Coalition lacks reliable ground troops. Britain, France and America don’t want to put boots on the ground themselves. But the “moderate” Syrians are a mishmash. Cameron says there are 70,000 of them. But most are not in a position to take territory in Islamic State’s heartland. Many are in southern Syria, a completely different part of the country. Another chunk are Kurds, who would not be welcome in Sunni Arab areas. Even Cameron, after two and a half pages of huffing and puffing, finally admits that “without transition, it will continue to be difficult to generate a Sunni force able to fight ISIL and hold ground in Eastern Syria”. (page 20) This grudging admission raises questions about the wisdom of the whole bombing escapade.
What’s more, nowhere in Cameron’s document does he say that the “moderate” rebels want us to bomb the jihadists. The prime minister’s case would be a lot stronger if he could produce some genuine moderates who advocate bombing.
Third, by joining the bombing in Syria, Britain will be seen by some Sunnis as aligning itself with Assad. Cameron, of course, says that Assad needs to go. But Syrians could easily be forgiven for thinking that Britain will be softening its line on Assad if it bombs the jihadists but leaves the brute in Damascus, who bears the lion’s share of responsibility for Syria’s civil war, unscathed.
There is a genuine risk of Britain collaborating with Assad via a chain reaction. After all, part of Cameron’s justification for attacking Islamic State is to help our ally France post the Paris attacks. Meanwhile, Francois Hollande has just foolishly agreed to swap intelligence with Vladimir Putin – and Russia’s tsar is allied with Assad in attempting to crush the “moderate” rebels.
Islamic State will again exploit such collaboration by chain reaction to argue that it alone can defend Sunnis against Crusaders. This is another way that bombing could be counterproductive.
Fourth, Cameron has not produced a long-term plan for helping Syria after the bombing stops. In the absence of this, the country could continue its downward spiral. Even if Islamic State were somehow defeated, other jihadists could spring up to fill the gap. Britain’s invasion of Iraq and military intervention in Libya show the dangers of not having a well thought through post-conflict plan.
Cameron’s failure to address this issue properly is especially culpable given his responsibility for the Libyan fiasco. True, the prime minister does say that “planning and preparation for helping to stability post-ISIL Syria is a priority”. He also says that a Syrian conference being held in London in February 2016 will be an opportunity to focus on this (page 22). But so far this doesn’t amount to anything close to a plan. By advocating military action before there’s a rebuild strategy, Cameron is putting the cart before the horse.
The prime minister has another argument for joining the bombing of Islamic State in Syria: that Britain itself faces a threat and we should therefore do our fair share to combat the jihadists. But there are several problems with this argument.
One is that, while the threat of terrorist attacks in the UK is real, they should not be exaggerated. According to Cameron, seven plots “linked to” or “inspired by” Islamic State have been foiled in the past year (page 3). Another problem is that bombing the jihadists will probably increase the risk of terrorist attacks in Britain, at least in the short term. Cameron doesn’t answer this point, merely saying the threat is “already very high” (page 9). The final objection is to Cameron’s notion of doing our fair share. If bombing is a good idea, Britain should definitely do its fair share. But that only works as an argument if bombing is a good idea in the first place.
In conclusion, Cameron hasn’t made the case for Britain to bomb Islamic State in Syria. To do so, he needs to produce a proper joined up strategy showing how military action will advance the peace process. He needs to give more detail of the intervention that is envisaged, while getting support from genuinely moderate rebels as well as Syrian civilians for what he plans. He also needs to come up with a good post-conflict plan. Until and unless he does that, MPs shouldn’t authorise bombing.
Hugo Dixon 